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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
This thesis examines the influence of the Conventional Armed Forces Treaty 
(CFE) on European security after 1990. While the purpose of this agreement was to 
eliminate possible military threats between North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) by keeping an adequate quantity level of 
armaments by each side, CFE by itself still is not guaranteed security of the Continent. 
The period during which the treaty was negotiated appears just as crucial for European 
security. Between the years when the CFE negotiations were held (1988 – 1990), some 
European countries confronted additional challenges. The CFE agreement started to be 
discussed while they were still communistic countries, and was concluded in some cases 
in democratic states. Such a situation caused a significant number of disagreements 
between the two sides, which influenced fulfillment of the CFE obligation in terms of 
agreed deadlines and quality of reductions’ tasks. However, in the case of some European 
countries, the CFE treaty still appears an historical event that initialized the process of 
joining allies. Additionally, the purpose of this thesis is to make the reader aware that 
existence of the CFE treaty, as an isolated agreement, is not as significant as in its 
usefulness in connection with NATO, for example.   
B. METHODOLOGY 
The thesis is based on introducing and evaluating of significance of the CFE 
treaty as an agreement that became a fundamental step toward European security after 
World War II. The material used includes sources related to the CFE treaty in terms of its 
origins, negotiation, implementation of treaty resolutions, and cooperation with NATO 
and other political organizations. Simultaneously, this thesis includes information from 
periodicals, newspapers and journals, and government documents that contain opinions of 
political and military leaders of European nations. In addition, this thesis cites materials 




C. CHAPTER OUTLINES 
This thesis is organized as follows. The second chapter covers important historical 
facts concerning the origins, as well as the negotiation phase, of the CFE treaty. The 
chapter describes the sequence of post-war historical events, which led to the signing of 
the CFE treaty. Simultaneously, this part of the thesis reflects an effort that has been 
made by nations and their authorities from the initiation of the conventional balance 
problem to fundamental negotiations and their conclusion. In addition, this chapter makes 
the reader aware of fact that after World War II, the large number of conventional armed 
forces of both Eastern and Western blocs was still considered a threat and, in spite of the 
final success, the CFE agreement was not easy to achieve.  
Chapter III examines the CFE treaty and its influence on security issues after the 
year 1990. This part of thesis emphasizes the fact that CFE treaty appears as one of the 
most significant agreements that has been reached since World War II, and its 
exceptionality is not only an outcome of force reductions in Europe at the beginning of 
1990s, but also a reflection of a new era in Europe. In addition, this chapter describes 
rules of mutual coexistence and cooperation between NATO and the CFE treaty. It shows 
the viewpoints of selected nations in connection with the CFE agreement considering a 
highly specific situation during which this document was signed and implemented. 
Moreover, this chapter describes the new, strategic shape of Europe, which started to be 
created at the beginning of 1990s. Simultaneously, Chapter III emphasizes the difficult 
position of some newly democratic states that, being under the communistic regime in the 
past, became rightful members of NATO. For them, becoming a new member of the 
alliance required appropriate balancing between the amount of military equipment that 
was allowed to be kept under the Soviet Union’s supervision, as well as under the NATO 
rules and obligations.  
Chapter IV concentrates in answering the following questions: What problems 
arose after the CFE treaty ratification? What steps have been taken to solve those issues? 
To what extent was implementation of the treaty effective as far as European security is 
concerned? Moreover, this part of thesis describes the current status and possible future 
perspectives of CFE verification in Europe.     
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II. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CFE TREATY 
A. ORIGINS OF THE CFE TREATY 
Europe is a continent significantly experienced by centuries of history, where not 
only local but also global conflicts were initiated. One of them, World War II, seen as an 
especially turbulent time in the old continent, was and still is deeply embedded in the 
awareness of societies. The large number of engaged conventional armed forces of both  
Eastern and Western blocs was still considered a threat after 1945. In order to decrease 
the tensions existing after the conflicts between the WTO and NATO, there was a need 
for a significant reduction of conventional armaments. Finally, an agreement establishing 
the exact number of conventional armed forces of both sides was reached on November 
19, 1990. The CFE treaty, which was signed on this day, appeared not only as a success 
of diplomacy, but also as a symbolic end of the Cold War period.  
However, in spite of the final success, the CFE agreement was not easy to 
achieve. It required the involvement of a considerable number of politicians, long 
negotiations, and sometimes compromises. 
This Chapter describes the sequence of post-war historical events which led to the 
signing of the CFE treaty. Simultaneously, this part of the thesis reflects an effort that has 
been made by nations and their authorities from the initiation of the conventional balance 
problem to fundamental negotiations and their conclusion.  
The late 1960s was a time when both blocs, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, became 
interested in the arms control issue. Until this time, the main aim of the Soviet Union was 
eliminating a German military threat. The Soviets wanted to achieve this aim through the 
neutralization of West Germany and the “unification” of East and West Germany under 
the control of a communistic regime. The aim of the arms control measures proposed by 
the Soviet Union was therefore to promote Germany as a state neutralized and controlled 
by the communist system. Moreover, Soviets wanted to counter Allied initiatives 
connected with rearmament of West Germany and integration of this state into NATO 
structures. The viewpoints of the East and West toward arms control were changed in the 
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mid-1960s.1 During the years 1966 and 1967, NATO experienced a high inflation rate 
and, at the same time, Western European countries wanted to reduce the high cost of 
defense. What is more, American involvement in Vietnam raised the question whether 
the United States could afford to maintain such a large number of military forces in 
Europe. The financial pressures, in connection with the general relaxation of tensions 
with the Soviets, made the arms control measures the best solution for the West to cope 
with the Warsaw Pact.2 
NATO’s interest in the simultaneous arms reduction with the Soviet Union 
became commonly known in the spring of 1967. The following statement was included in 
the communiqué of the NATO Council during the meeting in Luxemburg: “If conditions 
permit, a balanced reduction of forces by the East and West could be a significant step 
toward security in Europe. A contribution on the part of the Soviet Union and the Eastern 
European countries towards a reduction of forces would be welcomed as a gesture of 
peaceful intent.3” This statement reflects the strong need for force reductions in Europe in 
order to achieve conventional stability.  
This stability, according to Laurinda L. Rohn, exists only when, after a balancing 
of conventional capabilities, both sides are convinced that “(1) neither side can launch a 
successful attack against the other, and (2) either side can successfully repel any attack 
launched by the other.4”     
A few historical events, which took place at the turn of the late 1960s and early 
1970s, were evidence of insistent aiming at a reduction in armaments in Europe.  
One of them was the official offer made by the West to encourage the East to join 
NATO in order to search for progress toward peace through mutual force reductions. This 
proposal stated that: 
                                                 
1 William R. Bowman, Limiting Conventional Forces in Europe (Washington, DC: National Defense 
University Press, 1985), 2-3.   
2 Ibid., 4. 
3 Ibid.  
4 Laurinda L. Rohn, Conventional Forces in Europe: A New Approach to the Balance, Stability, and 
Arms Control (Santa Monica: RAND, 1990), 63.    
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Mutual force reductions should be reciprocal and balanced in scope and 
timing. 
Mutual reductions should represent a substantial and significant step, 
which serve to maintain the present degree of security at reduced cost, but 
should not be such as risk de-stabilizing the situation in Europe.    
Mutual reductions should be consonant with the aim of creating 
confidence in Europe generally and in the case of each party concerned. 
To this end, any new arrangement regarding forces should be consistent 
with the vital security interests of all parties and capable of being carried 
out effectively.5 
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), known as the 
Helsinki Process, was perceived as a background of the CFE treaty negotiations. On July 
3, 1973, representatives from 35 countries including the United States, Soviet Union and 
Canada, met to bridge the political, military and economic division of Europe. This 
conference was followed by a series of others, which took place in Madrid, Stockholm, 
and Vienna.6 The agreement among the 35 participating nations, known as the Helsinki 
Final Act, was reached in 1975. The implementation of several Confidence Building 
Measures (CBMs) connected with military matters was one of the resolutions. These 
Measures included mainly notification of maneuvers that involved more than 25,000 
troops (smaller-scale maneuvers could be notified voluntarily) and voluntary invitation of 
observers from other countries to take part in these military activities.7   
The talks were represented by the CSCE from the Eastern side, and the Mutual 
and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations from the Western side. In this 
process, the bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States 
appeared a significant step toward of mutual force reduction discussions.8  
                                                 
5 William R. Bowman, Limiting Conventional Forces in Europe (Washington, DC: National Defense 
University Press, 1985), 5-6. 
6 Joseph P. Harahan and John C. Kuhn, III, On-Site Inspections under the CFE Treaty (Washington, D. 
C.: The On-Site Inspection Agency, 1996), 4. 
7 William R. Bowman, Limiting Conventional Forces in Europe (Washington, DC: National Defense 
University Press, 1985), 70-71. 
8 Ibid., 6-7.  
 6
The MBFR negotiations, which started in 1973, were in general focused on 
proportional reduction of manpower rather than armaments.9 These negotiations were 
based on the following three principles established in the initial phase of the talks: 
The general objective of the negotiations is to contribute to a more stable 
relationship and to the strengthening of peace and security in Europe 
without diminishing the security of any party to the negotiations. 
The subject matter of the negotiations is to be ‘mutual reduction of forces 
and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe.’ 
The area of force reduction is the territory of seven countries: the two 
Germanies, the Western states of Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
Luxemburg; and the Eastern states of Poland and Czechoslovakia.10 
In addition, another agreement stated that only nations who possess troops within 
the affected countries would be obliged to obey the subsequent resolutions. That’s why 
the Western bloc was represented by the United States, West Germany, Canada, the 
United Kingdom and Benelux. The participants from the Eastern side included, as 
mentioned before, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and additionally, the Soviet Union and East 
Germany. Another group of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries that took part in the 
negotiations (Italy, Hungary, Norway, Greece, Denmark, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey) 
was given a status of special participants.11 
However, it should be realized that these negotiations did not proceed smoothly or 
without disagreements. There were a few areas within which an agreement could barely 
be reached. 
First of all, the number of troops deployed in central Europe by each bloc was an 
issue on which both sides were not able to reach agreement. Second of all, according to 
observers of the MBFR talks, the Soviet Union was against any reduction of its military 
power within the territory of Eastern Europe. It was a conviction that even an innocuous 
agreement, from the military point of view, that somehow violating the political 
                                                 
9 Richard A. Falkenrath, Shaping Europe’s Military Order, The Origins and Consequences of the CFE 
Treaty (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995), 2-3. 
10 William R. Bowman, Limiting Conventional Forces in Europe (Washington, DC: National Defense 
University Press, 1985), 7-8. 
11 Ibid., 8. 
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asymmetry in Europe, would be rejected by authorities in order to prevent the continent 
from Western influence. Finally, the reasons mentioned above made the MBFR 
negotiation more symbolic and diplomatic than serious.12  
It should be realized that the MBFR talks took place during a period when the 
relations between the West and East were not very friendly, and the negotiations 
appeared as the only functioning forum between the Western and Eastern blocs. Between 
the years 1979 and 1983, any agreement concerning arms control was not reached. This 
period of time was mainly dominated by the Polish crisis and reaction to the involvement 
of Soviet troops in Afghanistan.13 After more than a decade of negotiations, only the 
general agreement about the types of elements that should be included in the MBFR 
treaty had been reached, while a large number of crucial issues were still unsolved.14  
Another historical event that significantly influenced future conventional-force 
negotiations was the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), which 
took place between the years 1984 and 1986. The reduction and changes within the 
military armed forces, however, was not the aim of this conference. This meeting was 
mainly focused on issues concerning reduction of the risk of war and implementation of 
confidence building and “transparency” measures. These aspects were reflected in the 
final Stockholm Document signed by the 35 participating states.15 
Another significant issue that paved the way for the CFE treaty was a noticeable 
change in the Soviet Union’s policy in 1986.  
On April 18, 1986, Mikhail Gorbachev gave his speech calling for the new 
negotiations concerning armed forces reduction. He stated that:  
Agreement [should] be reached on substantial reductions in all 
components of the land forces and tactical air forces of the European states 
and the relevant forces of the USA and Canada deployed in Europe. The 
                                                 
12 Richard A. Falkenrath, Shaping Europe’s Military Order, The Origins and Consequences of the 
CFE Treaty (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995), 3-4. 
13 Graeme P. Auton, Arms Control and European Security (New York: Praeger, 1989), 106.    
14 William R. Bowman, Limiting Conventional Forces in Europe (Washington, DC: National Defense 
University Press, 1985), 11. 
15 Graeme P. Auton, Arms Control and European Security (New York: Praeger, 1989), 98-99. 
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formations and units to be reduced should be disbanded and their 
weaponry either destroyed or stored in national territories. Geographically, 
reductions, obviously, should cover the entire European territory from the 
Atlantic to the Urals.16  
This speech indicated that the problem of conventional armed forces control was 
becoming more and more essential to the government of the Soviet Union.17 Moreover, 
Gorbachev’s policy was significantly different from the Soviet policies of the past. On 
one hand, such a radical turn in policy was even viewed by the Western alliance as a 
good opportunity for improving conventional capabilities of NATO in comparison with 
the Warsaw Pact.18 On the other hand, there was little optimism that the “new thinking” 
of Gorbachev would be similar to conceptions represented by the West. What is more, 
such a policy was considered by a majority of Western officials and analysts as 
suspicious.19  
The issue of strengthening the security and stability on the European continent by 
armed forces reductions was on the agenda of the NATO foreign ministers meeting, 
which took place in Halifax in May 1986.20 During this meeting, as a response to 
Gorbachev’s speech on April 18, 1986, the High Level Task Force (HLTF) for 
conventional arms control was established. It is worth mentioning that France’s 
participation in the HLTF and filling of the “empty chair” was compensation for not 
attending the MBFR talks. In order to secure the attendance of France during the 
negotiations, the newly-created HLTF was not formally subordinated to NATO.21 The 
HLTF was an organ, which was responsible for developing a coordinated alliance 
proposal for the conventional arms reduction treaty.22 However, representatives from 
                                                 
16 Richard A. Falkenrath, Shaping Europe’s Military Order, The Origins and Consequences of the 
CFE Treaty (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995), 27. 
17 Ibid.  
18 Ibid., 6.  
19 Ibid., 4. 
20 Committee on Armed Services, Alliance and Defense Capabilities in Europe: Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Conventional Forces and Alliance Defense, 100th Cong., 1 st sess., 1987. 243. 
21 Richard A. Falkenrath, Shaping Europe’s Military Order, The Origins and Consequences of the 
CFE Treaty (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995), 14. 
22 Joseph P. Harahan and John C. Kuhn, III, On-Site Inspections under the CFE Treaty (Washington, 
D. C.: The On-Site Inspection Agency, 1996), 6. 
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Great Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy and the United States were 
members of an informal executive committee known as the “Quint”, created within the 
HLTF. Although the smaller members of the alliance didn’t know about the existence of 
the “Quint”, the majority of HLTF compromises have been previously reached within the 
confines of the “Quint.23” After long and difficult discussions among the 16-nation 
alliance, in December 1986, a proposition for negotiating a two-track (finally adopted) 
strategy was established. While one of them concerned Confidence-Building Measures in 
a broader and more open context by the 35 CSCE participating nations, the second one 
was tasked to discuss conventional force stability provisions, as well as phases of 
reduction between NATO and WTO nations.24  
On June 11 of the same year, the leaders from the Warsaw Pact met in Budapest 
in order to reaffirm and clarify Gorbachev’s speech given in April 1986. The 
communiqué, known as the “Budapest Appeal,” issued during this meeting introduced 
the plan of Soviet policy of conventional arms control for the next three years. This plan 
included, among others, suggestions concerning the level of armaments and personnel 
reductions, strengthening Confidence-and Security-Building Measures, verification 
provisions, and stabilizing measures.25 Simultaneously, apart from conventional force 
matters, the participants of the “Budapest Appeal” called for negotiations on the 
reduction of tactical nuclear weapons within the ATTU territory.26 However, it should be 
understood that the West was not always enthusiastic about the “Budapest Appeal”. 
Some politicians were concerned that it could be designed for goals different from those 
mentioned above. 
                                                 
23 Richard A. Falkenrath, Shaping Europe’s Military Order, The Origins and Consequences of the 
CFE Treaty (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995), 15. 
24 Joseph P. Harahan and John C. Kuhn, III, On-Site Inspections under the CFE Treaty (Washington, 
D. C.: The On-Site Inspection Agency, 1996), 6-7.  
25 Richard A. Falkenrath, Shaping Europe’s Military Order, The Origins and Consequences of the 
CFE Treaty (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995), 27-28. 
26 Ibid., 21. 
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Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, 
Charles H. Thomas,27 in his statement said that “…the Budapest appeal calls for equal 
NATO-Warsaw Pact reductions, which would leave NATO in a weaker position. The 
Soviets also want to mix tactical nuclear system into these conventional talks. They hope 
in this way to pursue their objective of denuclearizing Europe through the backdoor, as it 
were.28” 
Shortly after the “Budapest Appeal”, in December 1986, NATO announced its 
willingness to join preparatory talks with the WTO concerning a new stage of armed 
forces negotiations. Those talks took the form of meetings in Vienna, during which 
CSCE delegates from twenty-three members of the WTO and NATO were accompanied 
by disarmament experts. Starting with the first meeting on February 17, 1987, the CFE 
mandate appeared as the main topic on the agenda. In spite of the fact that ideas 
introduced in the “Budapest Appeal” were coherent to the Western concept of arms 
control, there were still a few issues that needed to be resolved before the beginning of 
the CFE negotiations. The armaments subjected to the talks, the goals of negotiations, 
participating states, the connections of the new talks with CSCE and demarcation 
territories in which the treaty would apply appeared as the most important matters.29 The 
West, however, identified the source of instability in Europe with the Warsaw Pact’s 
forces stating that “since NATO considered the Warsaw Pact’s forces to be the source of 
instability in Europe, and its own forces to be a source of stability, the basic structural 
objective of the new talks should be to reduce the forces of the WTO by a substantial 
amount and the forces of NATO by a token amount, if at all.30”  
In spite of existing confusion about the Soviet Union’s policy towards arms 
control, the late 1980s once again confirmed the superpower’s willingness to introduce 
significant cuts in armaments.  
                                                 
27 Committee on Armed Services, Alliance and Defense Capabilities in Europe: Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Conventional Forces and Alliance Defense, 100th Cong., 1 st sess., 1987. 242.  
28 Ibid., 244.  
29 Richard A. Falkenrath, Shaping Europe’s Military Order, The Origins and Consequences of the 
CFE Treaty (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995), 29. 
30 Ibid., 30. 
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On December 7, 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev gave a speech to the General 
Assembly of the United Nations that significantly contributed to the acceleration of the 
CFE process.31 He announced the reduction of 5,000 tanks and six divisions within the 
Soviet units stationed in Eastern Europe.32 From NATO’s point of view, these forces 
were considered the main threat to the alliance. At the same time, other members of the 
Warsaw Pact introduced considerable defense budget cuts (in the range of 10-17 percent), 
which caused a simultaneous reduction of military forces.33 In addition, the massive 
withdrawal of forces reflected the weakening bonds between the Warsaw Pact 
members.34 
The language used in the CFE mandate, which was finally signed on January 10, 
1989 in Vienna, indicates that most of the concessions connected with CFE matters were 
made by the WTO. According to the CFE mandate, the conventional armaments and 
equipment based on land (excluding chemical and nuclear weapons and naval forces) 
should be subjected to negotiations. In addition, even the existence of multiple 
capabilities (other than conventional) of some conventional weapons would not exclude 
this equipment from negotiations, and would not be the matter of creating a separate 
category for it. The CFE mandate, signed by the sixteen NATO members and seven 
Warsaw Pact members, was a brief prelude of upcoming talks. Simultaneously, it almost 
perfectly converged with preferences of the alliance and violated every principle that 
characterized the policy of arms control after the Stalin era. What is more, the CFE 
mandate emphasized that every country taking part in negotiations would act as an 
individual state and not as a member of an alliance.35 The mandate finally paved the way 
for CFE negotiations that started two months later.  
                                                 
31 Richard A. Falkenrath, Shaping Europe’s Military Order, The Origins and Consequences of the 
CFE Treaty (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995), 24-25.  
32 Congressional Budget Office, Budgetary and Military Effects of a Treaty Limiting Conventional 
Forces in Europe, 1990. 9.     
33 Richard A. Falkenrath, Shaping Europe’s Military Order, The Origins and Consequences of the 
CFE Treaty (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995), 25-26.  
34 Joseph P. Harahan and John C. Kuhn, III, On-Site Inspections under the CFE Treaty (Washington, 
D. C.: The On-Site Inspection Agency, 1996), 9. 
35 Richard A. Falkenrath, Shaping Europe’s Military Order, The Origins and Consequences of the 
CFE Treaty (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995), 33-36. 
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B. FROM NEGOTIATION TO SIGNING THE CFE TREATY 
The negotiation between the twenty-three states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact 
began in Vienna, on March 9, 1989.36 According to the mandate, during the discussion, 
the conventional armed forces within Atlantic-to-the Urals (ATTU) area were taken 
under consideration.37 The concentration of military forces in this area was the highest 
ever known during peacetime. Moreover, the conventional armaments signified the 
greatest military potential ever accumulated. The objectives of the CFE negotiations 
between members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact were connected mainly with the 
establishment of a stable and secure lower-level balance of conventional armed forces 
and the elimination of a capability for launching a surprise attack or starting a large-scale 
offensive action.38 NATO’s proposal concerning its amount of military equipment, which 
included categories such as ACVs, artillery and tanks, was approximately 10 percent 
below the level of NATO armaments.39 In spite of certain objections to NATO’s 
proposal, ceilings of some categories proposed by the Warsaw Pact were identical to 
those of the West.40 (as indicated in the table below).   
                                                 
36 United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, CFE Negotiation on Conventional Armed 
Forces in Europe, 1989. 1.  
37 Charles T. Kelley, Jr., Methodology for Examining Effects of Arms Control Reduction on Tactical 
Air Forces: An Example from Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty Analysis (Santa Monica: Rand, 
1993), 1.  
38 United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, CFE Negotiation on Conventional Armed 
Forces in Europe, 1989. 1. 
39 Richard A. Falkenrath, Shaping Europe’s Military Order, The Origins and Consequences of the 
CFE Treaty (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995), 47. 
40 Ibid., 49.  
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MAIN BATTLE TANKS 20,000 20,000 








MANPOWER NATO proposal addresses U.S. 
and Soviet manpower only, with U.S. and 
Soviet ground and air stationed manpower 
levels in Europe to be limited to 275,000 
each.   
1,350,000  
*NATO’s proposed ceiling refers to total NATO and Warsaw Pact holdings of 
permanently land-based, combat-capable aircraft. The ceiling reflects a far broader 
definition of combat aircraft than that used by the Warsaw Pact, which has proposed a 
ceiling for “strike” aircraft only.     
Source: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, CFE Negotiation 
on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 1989. 3. 
 
The late 1980s abounded with many historical events, which significantly 
influenced the CFE negotiations. Some politicians saw German unification as a threat, 
which could violate European security and stability. Such a way of thinking forced them 
to undertake principal steps toward assuring peace on the Continent.  
During the Soviet-American summit, which took place in May 1990, President 
Bush introduced a “nine point plan” in order to assuage the Soviet Union’s fear which 
was the outcome of possible consequences of German unification. In accordance with the 
second point of this plan, NATO was prepared to discuss further limitations of personnel 
directly after the achievement of CFE. However, such assurances were not sufficient for 
the Soviet Union.  In July 1990, during NATO’s summit in London, known as the 
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London Declaration, the alliance reiterated its pledge to negotiate issues connected with 
manpower.41           
After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the communist government of 
the German Democratic Republic, Germany became recognized as a single, united 
nation, which became a fact on October 3, 1990. United Germany’s possession of the 
largest air force and national army in Central Europe was a serious concern for treaty 
negotiators. However, the special declaration issued by Germany promised considerable 
cuts in troop strengths, and simultaneously encouraged other European nations to discuss 
their conventional armed forces limits. At the same time, when the communist regime 
collapsed in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland and Hungary, Soviet troops 
were leaving the territory of Eastern Europe.42 
Including some pieces of military equipment in the total number of conventional 
armed forces was another issue to resolve before the signing of the CFE treaty. The 
disagreement over the definition of a combat aircraft is a good example that illustrates 
this problem. 
While NATO, focusing on its capabilities wanted to limit the number of the 
aircraft by the treaty, Eastern states, categorizing this equipment by mission (not 
connected with the supporting of ground forces), were against including this aircraft in 
the treaty. Finally, an agreement was reached after a discussion between U.S. Secretary 
of State James A. Baker, III, and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, who met 
in New York City in late September 1990. Ultimately, each group of states was allowed 
to keep 6,800 combat aircraft.43 By October 1990, the majority of agreements concerning 
the CFE treaty had been achieved. A significant (and even too large) number of them, 
according to other signatories, were an outcome of bilateral discussions between the 
Soviet Union and the United States. Since that time delegates from European states 
started to meet among themselves, which strengthened the perspective of finalizing the 
                                                 
41 Richard A. Falkenrath, Shaping Europe’s Military Order, The Origins and Consequences of the 
CFE Treaty (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995), 71-72. 
42 Joseph P. Harahan and John C. Kuhn, III, On-Site Inspections under the CFE Treaty (Washington, 
D. C.: The On-Site Inspection Agency, 1996), 8-9. 
43 Ibid., 16-17.  
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CFE treaty as well as its implementation. The CFE treaty became a document ready to 
sign when representatives achieved a final agreement on all provisions.44  
Finally, during the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which 
took place in the middle of November 1990, in Paris, the leaders of 22 countries signed 
the CFE treaty.45 The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty was signed on 
November 19, 1990.46 “At that point, the signatory states included Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Turkey, the 
Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States.47”  
The CFE treaty consists of 23 articles, 8 protocols, and 3 declarations. The articles 
introduce aspects connected with treaty definitions and requirements connected with 
equipment, time periods and locations. The protocols contain procedural guidance with 
reference to requirements presented in the 23 articles. 48 Ultimately, the three declarations 
mentioned above apply to land-based naval aircraft and attack helicopters, 49personnel 
strength50 and personnel strength of German Armed Forces.51 
There is no denying that the signing of the CFE treaty was one of the most 
significant events which took place in Europe after World War II. This document 
appeared as a helpful tool to prevent possible conflicts on the European continent that 
could arise. Simultaneously, the treaty is a symbol of the end of the Cold War, which 
considerably influenced some countries that later on became treaty signatories.    
                                                 
44 Joseph P. Harahan and John C. Kuhn, III, On-Site Inspections under the CFE Treaty (Washington, 
D. C.: The On-Site Inspection Agency, 1996), 12-13.  
45 Ibid., 13. 
46 Ibid., 1.  
47 Ibid., 13. 
48 Ibid., 15.  
49 Ibid.  
50 Ibid., 18. 
51 On-Site Inspection Agency, Treaty Between the Twenty Two Sovereign Nations on the Reduction of 
their Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 19 November 90, 112. 
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Apart from being a conflict-preventive treaty, the CFE agreement caused the 
reduction of more than 38,500 armaments (see tables below). At the same time, the 
treaty’s verification measures appeared as the most detailed and complex in comparison  
with other arms control agreements.52 However, there was a need for modernization of 
the CFE treaty in order to adapt it to the changes, which were initiated by the last years of 
the Cold War.53 
 
Table 2.  NATO Declared Holdings and Liabilities  
 
TLE CFE Limit Declared Liability* Percentage of 
Holdings 
Tanks 20,000 25,091 5,949 24% 
Artillery 20,000 20,620 2,334 11% 
ACVs 30,000 34,453 4,631 13% 
Aircraft 6,800 5,939 0 0% 
Helicopters 2,000 1,736 0 0% 
*Collectively, NATO nations set their CFE limits below the treaty limits. All 
figures as of November 19, 1990, the CFE Treaty initial data exchange.  
Source: Joseph P. Harahan and John C. Kuhn, III, On-Site Inspections under the 
CFE Treaty (Washington, D. C.: The On-Site Inspection Agency, 1996), 20.  
 
Table 3. WTO Holdings and Liabilities* 
 
TLE CFE Limit Declared Liability Percentage of 
Holdings 
Tanks 20,000 33,191 13,191 40% 
Artillery 20,000 26,953 6,953 26% 
ACVs 30,000 42,949 12,949 30% 
Aircraft 6,800 8,372 1,572 19% 
Helicopters 2,000 1,701 0 0% 
*All figures as of November 19, 1990, the CFE Treaty initial data exchange.  
Source: Joseph P. Harahan and John C. Kuhn, III, On-Site Inspections under the 
CFE Treaty (Washington, D. C.: The On-Site Inspection Agency, 1996), 21.
                                                 
52 Joseph P. Harahan and John C. Kuhn, III, On-Site Inspections under the CFE Treaty (Washington, 
D. C.: The On-Site Inspection Agency, 1996), 1. 
53 Editorial and Publications Department. Zdzislaw Lachowski, The Adapted CFE Treaty and the 
Admission of the Baltic States to NATO, http://editors.sipri.se/pubs/CFE_Treaty_report.pdf (accessed Apr, 
23, 2005).  
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Table 4. Declared National CFE Holdings in November 1990 
 
Nation Tanks Artillery ACVs Combat Aircraft 
Attack 
Helicopters 
Warsaw Treaty Organization States 
USSR 20,694 13,828 29,348 6,445 1,330 
Bulgaria 2,416 2,474 2,010 387 44 
Czechoslovakia 3,035 3,485 4,359 369 56 
Hungary 1,345 1,047 1,720 110 39 
Poland 2,850 2,300 2,377 654 128 
Romania 2,851 3,819 3,135 407 104 
Total WTO 33,191 26,953 42,949 8,372 1,701 
NATO States 
Belgium 359 376 1,282 191 0 
Canada 77 38 277 45 12 
Denmark 419 553 316 106 3 
France 1,358 1,330 4,125 700 429 
Germany 7,133 4,644 9,598 1,064 357 
Greece 1,725 1,941 1,639 480 0 
Italy 1,912 2,222 3,591 584 169 
Netherlands 913 838 1,467 196 91 
Norway 205 532 146 90 0 
Portugal 146 334 259 96 0 
Spain 854 1,373 1,259 252 28 
Turkey 2,888 3,202 1,554 589 0 
UK 1,198 636 3,193 842 368 
USA 5,904 2,601 5,747 704 279 
Total NATO 25,091 20,620 34,453 5,939 1,736 
Source: Joseph P. Harahan and John C. Kuhn, III, On-Site Inspections under the 
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III. CFE TREATY AND ITS INFLUENCE ON SECURITY ISSUES 
SINCE 1990 
A. FITTING NATO AND THE CFE RESOLUTION TOGETHER  
The CFE treaty appears as the one of the most significant agreements that has 
been reached since World War II. Its exceptionality is not only an outcome of force 
reductions in Europe at the beginning of 1990s, but also a reflection of a new era in 
Europe. This is the time when the Soviet Union was dissolved and divided into new 
independent states. The Russian military forces inherited after the great Soviet empire, as 
well as the internal situation within all newly created countries, influenced the security in 
Europe considerably. It was a highly specific situation during which the CFE treaty was 
signed and implemented. Moreover, Europe at the beginning of 1990s was a place where 
a lot of countries introduced democratic political systems, which in some cases changed 
the general view on security on the Continent. In addition, during the last years of the 
twentieth century, few democratic states became rightful members of NATO. Their 
membership required the appropriate balancing between the number of military 
equipment that was allowed to be kept under the communistic regime, and according to 
NATO rules and obligations. All those aspects mentioned above made the CFE treaty 
difficult to accommodate and implement. The revolution in European armaments caused 
the creation of new strategic centers in Europe, as well as a totally different approach 
toward its security. This Chapter examines the CFE treaty and its influence on security 
issues after the year of 1990. 
The CFE treaty was signed on November 19, 1990, by the 16 members of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and six members of the Warsaw Pact. This 
agreement required significant cuts in the military equipment located on the European 
continent. According to initial plans, the Warsaw Pact was obliged to destroy over 34,500 
pieces of equipment (tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery pieces, combat aircraft), 
which represented more than 30 percent of its arsenal. At the same time, NATO pledged 
to destroy 3,700 armaments, which represented only 5 percent of its total number of 
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military equipment. Additionally, both blocs agreed to conduct extensive inspections in 
order to ensure compliance with the signed treaty.54 
The reduction of forces under the CFE treaty was not easy, especially for Russia, 
the main successor of the Soviet Union, which still had large numbers of military 
equipment deployed abroad.  
According to the Congressional Budget Office, the balance of military forces in 
Europe was shifted in NATO’s favor because of recent political changes and the potential 
benefits of the CFE treaty. For example, in 1988, the advantage of Warsaw Pact nations 
over the NATO countries was 1.5 to 1.55 
The numbers mentioned above reflect the large scale of force reductions after 
1990. It was (and still is) a great challenge to facilitate NATO demands and the CFE 
resolutions. 
NATO, as well as the CFE treaty, has been undergoing some changes during the 
post-Cold War era. In general, NATO conducts operations and projects power away from 
the previous concentration of stationary defense. Moreover, it created its own pattern in 
Central and Eastern Europe, in order to refine these states’ ability to undertake 
cooperation in military operations and to use the NATO’s offices in promoting 
democratic standards in the partner states. Simultaneously, it established new military 
command structures, developed Western European Union (WEU) mission profiles and 
joint task force headquarters (CJTF), which are still tested.56 
After signing the CFE treaty, NATO started to support former Warsaw Pact 
countries to implement the resolutions of the CFE agreement. Although limited, the aid to 
post-communist nations was based on funding and conducting the CFE training courses 
and discussing ways to improve treaty implementation during seminars.57 In 1993 and 
1994, 80 participants from national verification agencies took part in different courses at 
                                                 
54 Committee on Foreign Relations, The CFE Treaty: Hearing before the Subcommittee on European 
Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 102nd Cong., 1 st sess., 1991, 345. 
55 Ibid.  
56 John E. Peters, The Changing Quality of Stability in Europe, The Conventional Forces in Europe 
Treaty Toward 2001 (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000), 13.  
57 Report to Congressional Requesters, Conventional Arms Control: Former Warsaw Pact Nation’s 
Treaty Compliance and U.S. Cost Control, December 1993, 24. 
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the NATO school at Oberammergau, Germany. Other inspectors from the Eastern bloc 
took advantage of participation in the NATO course on monitoring CFE reductions, 
which was offered at the Belgian Military Camp at Leopoldville.58 From 1992 through 
1996, these seminars, which were for directors and higher staffs of the national 
verification agencies, were sponsored by NATO’s Verification Coordination Committee 
(VCC). Their main goal was to raise the issues of the CFE implementation process as 
well as to discuss common matters and approaches connected with it.59  
At the same time, inspectors from the former Warsaw Pact nations were being 
included on some inspection teams led by NATO.60  The multinational teams took part in 
inspections conducted in Eastern Europe. In 1993, all the CFE inspections led by NATO 
started to work as multinational.61 Sometimes, the participation of representatives from 
the Soviet bloc countries in inspections could be seen as an awkward situation.  
It was observed by the Director of the German Federal Armed Forces Verification 
Center, Brigadier General Heinz Loquai, that,  
At first it was not so easy for the inspected countries, especially the former 
Warsaw Pact countries, to understand why guest inspectors were coming 
along with the [NATO nation] inspection teams. But in my opinion, the 
participation of the guest inspectors is a good development. Germany has 
opened more than 50 percent of all its inspections for the guest 
inspectors.62 
The statement of the Director of NATO’s Verification and Implementation 
Coordination Section (VICS), about extremely good mutual cooperation during 
inspections, initiated other cooperative ideas. In June 1994, a statement to NATO issued 
by VCC allowed Western inspectors to join Eastern-led CFE inspections teams in order 
to conduct East-on–East verification.63            
                                                 
58 Joseph P. Harahan and John C. Kuhn, III, On-Site Inspections under the CFE Treaty (Washington, 
D. C.: The On-Site Inspection Agency, 1996), 253.  
59 Ibid., 227-228. 
60 Report to Congressional Requesters, Conventional Arms Control: Former Warsaw Pact Nation’s 
Treaty Compliance and U.S. Cost Control, December 1993, 24. 
61Joseph P. Harahan and John C. Kuhn, III, On-Site Inspections under the CFE Treaty (Washington, 
D. C.: The On-Site Inspection Agency, 1996), 227. 
62 Ibid., 253.  
63 Ibid. 
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In order to reduce the classic cost of destroying military equipment, the countries 
representing the two blocs agreed to implement new methods (proposed earlier by 
Russia, Ukraine and Romania) for destroying tanks and armored combat vehicles. This 
resolution appeared not only as a reasonable solution for reducing the cost of destroying 
equipment, but also was a time saving method.64 
The sponsoring of inspectors’ training, conducting seminars and including 
instructors from the Eastern bloc on inspection teams was not the only help provided by 
NATO members. 
Additionally, U.S. officials were helping former Soviet republics by visiting their 
capitals in order to estimate the treaty implementation needs and to provide 
supplementary hints. These trips resulted in providing six former Soviet republics (CFE 
signatories) with computers, software and training for a CFE-related communication 
network.65  
In 1994, during the time when the treaty nations agreed to share data from on-site 
inspections, NATO nations helped them by expanding VERITY – the computerized 
database. This system was responsible mainly for gathering information about the 
national forces of almost all treaty states, as well as inspections.66 Apart from 24 hour 
availability of VERITY at NATO Headquarters, this system was simultaneously 
identified as electronic mail. Moreover, the majority of NATO countries found it helpful 
in preparing for the verification mission.67        
Another issue that arose after the signing of the CFE treaty in 1990 was the 
enlargement of NATO. While a democratic system was introduced in some European 
countries, few of them were trying (mostly successfully) to become rightful members of 
the alliance.  
                                                 
64 Report to Congressional Requesters, Conventional Arms Control: Former Warsaw Pact Nation’s 
Treaty Compliance and U.S. Cost Control, December 1993, 24. 
65 Ibid.  
66 Joseph P. Harahan and John C. Kuhn, III, On-Site Inspections under the CFE Treaty (Washington, 
D. C.: The On-Site Inspection Agency, 1996), 227. 
67 Ibid., 254. 
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The inclusion of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary within the NATO 
structures appeared as the most remarkable post-Cold War alliance development. In spite 
of this fact, NATO has worked hard to more strongly develop its Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership Council (EAPC) as well as the Partnership for Peace (PfP).68 
It was expected that NATO growth would influence the balance of conventional 
forces set up by the CFE treaty. It was supposed that three future members of the alliance 
might want to negotiate changes within the CFE agreement due to the expansion of 
NATO and the decreasing of the old Eastern bloc.69     
However, it should be realized that countries that applied for NATO membership, 
in some cases, were opposing the reduction of military equipment inside their territories.     
In 1997, U.S. government officials stated that “…The Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland, despite signing NATO accession protocol on December 16, are hesitant to 
accept lower limits until they are full members of NATO…”70 
Moreover, in the case of NATO enlargement by three European states, the 
stationing of alliance forces on the territory of those countries would be another issue to 
discuss as far as the number of equipment allowed by the CFE treaty. The constraints 
concerning the appropriate number of deployed armaments would arise from NATO’s 
and host states’ sides.71         
The issue of leaving the former Soviet bloc by Eastern Europeans countries, and 
their membership in NATO, created questions regarding how the destruction obligations 
created by the CFE treaty will be changed.72 
 
                                                 
68 John E. Peters, The Changing Quality of Stability in Europe, The Conventional Forces in Europe 
Treaty Toward 2001 (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000), 14. 
69 Sarah Walking, “NATO paper outlines approach to CFE treaty ‘modernization,’” Arms Control 
Today, Vol. 26, no. 8 (October 1996): 25.  
70 Wade Boese, “NATO proposes lower CFE ceilings not requiring actual force cuts,” Arms Control 
Today, Vol. 27, no. 8 (November/December 1997): 25. 
71 Columbia International Affairs Online. Richard G. Lugar, Victoria Nuland, Russia, Its Neighbors, 
and an Enlarging NATO, http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/lur01/index.html (accessed Jan, 11, 2005).   
72 Committee on Foreign Relations, The CFE Treaty: Hearing before the Subcommittee on European 
Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 102nd Cong., 1 st sess., 1991, 222. 
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Former Secretary of State James Addison Baker, in response to this matter, stated 
that:  
Eastern European states enthusiastically support the treaty and worked 
successfully to provisions of special interest to them. They will benefit in 
general from the stable security framework, including the vastly increased 
transparency, established by CFE. In particular, they will benefit from the 
Soviet reductions and limits that the treaty requires and the legally-binding 
multilateral framework it provides to lock in Soviet withdrawals from 
Eastern Europe...73  
Moreover, Baker claimed that both Eastern European states and the Soviets are 
obliged to conduct large equipment reductions according to the “sufficiency rule” 
proposed by NATO. This rule was an assurance that the other Eastern states, distinct 
from prior to the CFE period, will always have at least about one-third of the entire 
Eastern allowances ready to divide among themselves. What is more, the treaty’s 
provisions promote Eastern European independence from the Soviets, and prohibit a state 
from deploying its own forces on the territory of another state without its agreement. The 
Soviet Union itself could be inspected by Central and Eastern European countries.74 
According to Baker, 
if one of the East European states were to announce its intention to leave 
its Group of States or to join the other Group (NATO), an extraordinary 
conference would no doubt be requested. […] Signatories would have to 
decide at this conference how to deal with the situation…75 
In his speech, Michael Guhin, Deputy Assistant Director for Multilateral Affairs, 
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)76 stated that  
…CFE probably would have been adapted in some form or other without 
NATO enlargement, I would suspect. But the fact that we are faced with 
looking at NATO enlargement, I think, provides an additional and a very 
key incentive. The reason I say that is that CFE is one mechanism by  
                                                 
73 Committee on Foreign Relations, The CFE Treaty: Hearing before the Subcommittee on European 
Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 102nd Cong., 1 st sess., 1991, 222. 
74 Ibid.  
75 Ibid. 
76 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Treaty on Conventional Armed 
Forces in Europe (CFE) (Washington, DC, 1997), III. 
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which the United States and NATO allies can help assure or provide 
Russia with greater confidence that NATO expansion is not going to be 
threatening to them…77  
However, NATO enlargement was not only identified as a good supplement to the 
CFE treaty. The disagreements were mainly the outcome of significant changes that took 
place after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
John E. Peters, in his book titled “CFE and Military Stability in Europe,” 
expressed his opinion that NATO enlargement was seen as a process with negative 
impact on CFE. It was expected that Russian concerns about the CFE could have broader 
results as far as European security is concerned. Russia was supposed to have to demand 
some changes in the CFE treaty that concern the main decisions. It was even expected 
that this country could scrap the settlement under excessive circumstances.78 According 
to John E. Peters,  
stability would suffer because of the Russian perception that East-West 
competition had been restarted. Moscow would probably assess NATO as 
an expansionist, anti-Russian entity and determine to contain it. Despite 
her paucity of resources, Russia would do what she could to undermine 
further regional stability, to shore up her frontiers, and to restore her 
ability to confront the West. This competition would create new incentives 
for Moscow to resist the expansion of Western influence and to offset 
NATO expansion with initiatives of her own: perhaps limited arms racing 
and alignment with other extra-European, anti-Western forces, for 
example. NATO enlargement would thus be bad not only for the CFE 
Treaty but for European stability as a whole.79 
Another matter, which is connected with fitting both NATO and CFE together, is 
their modernization and propositions for distributing Treaty-limited equipment (TLE). 
The aspects mentioned above were significantly influenced by the break-up of Soviet 
Union.  
Any factor that would reduce NATO’s aggregate allocations, even in spite of its 
enlargement, would have potentially dangerous consequences on the alliance. According 
to John E. Peters, problems with TLE as well as the process of Confidence-and Security-                                                 
77Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces 
in Europe (CFE) (Washington, DC, 1997), 6.  
78 John E. Peters, CFE and Military Stability in Europe, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1997), 18. 
79 Ibid., 18-19.  
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Building Measures (CSBMs), is caused by their abilities to constrain NATO deployments 
and conducted operations. It is commonly known that Russia does not support the 
stationing of NATO forces in Central Europe. There is a possibility of Russia and other 
countries demanding to introduce proposals that would limit the number of multinational 
operations. In other words, a limited number of troops from a limited number of countries 
would take part in certain operations. This would undermine wide participation in 
alliance’s activities and could be significant for all NATO’s options of establishing its 
command structures and strategic concepts. Moreover, any attempts to modernize NATO 
would be destructive to the key attributes of CFE. At the same time, some of the options 
of CFE adaptation constitute obstacles that could limit NATO-modernization options.80 
The withdrawal of Soviet conventional forces from the territory of the Central 
Front considerably strengthened the position of the alliance in this region. Moreover, the 
main goal of the decentralization of Soviet forces in Central and Eastern Europe has been 
achieved. However, this connection between the goals of NATO and arms verification 
lasted a short period of time. In spite of the CFE treaty implementation process, which 
was in progress, the end of the Cold War and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact was a 
motivating power. During the period of European transition, the withdrawal of Soviet 
forces from Central Europe was facilitated by the new direction taken by the CFE treaty. 
The CFE agreement considered new important issues that arose during this time – the 
possible threat caused by German unification and the possibility of restarting the arms 
race in Europe. After all, it became clear that in order to strengthen stability in Europe, 
there is a need for modernization of the CFE and NATO.81 
The stability in Europe is the main factor explaining the coexistence and 
cooperation of the CFE and NATO. Nevertheless, keeping in mind the rules and 
restrictions of both – the alliance and the CFE agreement, stability can be achieved by 
considering a few key aspects. 
Timothy Wallace Crawford, in his book titled “Strategic Architecture and the 
Dilemma of Dual-Modernization,” determines four mechanisms of stability. The first one 
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– system stability – is explained as sharing common interests by the most powerful 
European countries in order to preserve the status quo in Europe before procedures 
connected with arms control take part. Strategic stability is described by the author as the 
ability to reduce levels of forces between two blocs without giving the Soviets the chance 
to modify the Cold War settlement in Europe. This point of view is an argument against 
hasty NATO enlargement, which can be done without considering adjustments to the 
security structure in Europe. Such a situation can initiate a defensive response from the 
Russian Federation. Another kind of stability described by Crawford is dense stability. In 
this case, countries are encouraged to collaborate in the spirit of “cooperative security” 
and “institutional enmeshment.” This type of stability suggests that NATO membership 
can be used as a method of European integration. In some cases being a member of the 
alliance can lead to EU membership. Deep stability is the last variant of stability 
introduced by the author. It is usually recognized as adopting by countries liberal 
democratic forms of government. The democratic identity, harmonization of interests, 
common goals and recognition of legitimacy of other democratic governments, are the 
main factors that constitute the idea of deep stability.82  
Finally, Crawford recognizes the following three options of possible dual-
modernization of NATO and CFE: 
• “Reconstruct CFE, Conditional NATO Enlargement; 
• Reform CFE, Restrain NATO Enlargement; 
• CFE Redux, Robust NATO Enlargement.83”  
The appropriate balance between NATO and CFE is indispensable for 
strengthening security and stability in Europe. However, the contemporary political and 
economical situation on the Continent makes this task not easily achievable. 
In order to reach such a unity between those two institutions, some of the forms 
each organization might take should be taken under consideration. 
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The CFE treaty with its mechanisms is not sufficient for solving today’s 
problems, such as crises within countries and friction between neighbors. The 
enlargement of its membership and its influence on stability in Europe is doubtful. One of 
the possible ways the CFE treaty can take is the process of harmonizing its functions with 
other European security institutions. Moreover, even sub-regional measures could be 
undertaken in the case of some troubled territories. The “flank agreement” (described in 
the fourth chapter of this thesis), for example, can be an initiation for signing the regional 
arms pacts in the future by nations such as Norway and Turkey, for which this problem 
appears as a key issue. Nevertheless, the Dayton Accords proved that some sub-regional 
agreements can be seen doubtfully.84 
The most promising option for CFE is continuity in conducting deeper reductions 
of Treaty-limited equipment, increasing the number of conducted inspections, as well as 
further steps taken within the area of confidence- and stability-building. The option of 
CFE enlargement could be influential in extending stability in European territories. 
Moreover, in comparison with the Vienna Document 1994, the CFE treaty is considered 
an institution that proposes a greater level of confidence in the stability of certain regions. 
What is more, it is the key institution that precisely monitors military actions that take 
place within the member states.85 
According to John E. Peters, NATO as an institution is more flexible than the 
CFE treaty described above and has three main options. First of all, countries that are the 
members of the alliance have a possibility of organizing themselves in order to give a 
group response to the potential threat. In spite of the fact that those operations can have a 
NATO or non-NATO character (IFOR in Bosnia or Alba in Albania), the timely 
responses and lack of forces for unexpected contingency situations can cause problems. 
As a second option, Peters introduces the establishment of standing crisis response 
instruments within NATO structures. In this case, the main inconvenience would be that 
the country that is responsible for providing different kinds of military services 
(communications, headquarters, etc.) might have no interest in the dissolution of a 
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conflict in certain areas, which in consequence can lead to the delaying of deployment. 
Finally, the last option given by the author is the idea of the creation of a command 
responsible for crisis response and power projection, which would be available in a short 
time period (less than 60 days). Placing forces in positions without knowing the sources 
of a specific case, as well as funds paid for relocation, reorganization and equipment of 
forces, would make this option quite expensive.86  
Bearing in mind all the possible options for NATO and CFE, there is a need to 
skillfully combine them to fit the European security demands.  
Keeping European arsenals small enough by restriction of CFE treaty appears a 
reasonable solution between those two institutions. In this case, all potential conflicts that 
could arise would be successfully managed by NATO, as long as they are small in size 
and limited in geographical territory. At the same time, there is a need for using modest 
sized forces in contemporary military operations. The deployment of troops in Chechnya 
(in late 1994, Moscow deployed 40,000 troops, 230 tanks, 388 artillery pieces87), for 
example, didn’t take advantage of large inventories of TLE. Despite the fact that CFE 
was not so helpful in local conflicts after 1990, in contemporary Europe it prevents arms 
races and conflicts between the great continental powers. Simultaneously, NATO should 
undertake activities in order to improve its abilities to respond to a wider scale of 
hostilities in the future.88 
Finally, John E. Peters identified the role of NATO as an institution acting like a 
fire brigade, where the scale of conflict is limited by CFE resolutions. In spite of the fact 
that NATO has been successful considering its experience in the post-cold war period, 
CFE shouldn’t be expected to protect Europe from the local conflicts. Although NATO is 
obliged to improve its ability to respond to small conflicts, both the alliance and CFE are 
responsible for strengthening security and stability in Europe.89 
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B. VIEW OF CFE TREATY IN THE UNITED STATES, RUSSIA AND 
GERMANY  
After signing the CFE treaty, the military order of the European continent was 
significantly changed. Some nations, which played and still play an important role in 
Europe from a historical point of view, were considerably influenced by this event. The 
following introduces how the CFE treaty was seen from the United States’, Russian and 
German points of view. It seems interesting how the countries historically observed as 
hegemonies, or even aggressors, approached the CFE issue. 
In July 10, 1992, Press Secretary Fitzwater stated that,  
…CFE is a key indication of the new states’ commitment to achieving 
lower and more stable levels of conventionally forces in Europe. Along 
with our treaty partners, the United States has worked hard to make CFE a 
reality. In the end, it was achieved because all participants, East and West, 
recognized that CFE’s unprecedented force reductions, information 
exchanges, and verification provisions are the cornerstone for efforts to 
further improve European security in the years ahead 90  
The statement mentioned above confirms that, after signing the CFE treaty in 
1990, the United States was very active in the area of implementing treaty resolutions and 
helping other European nations adjust to the new military order. 
The multinational inspection teams led by U.S. inspectors was an opportunity for 
allied governments to broader understand the activities connected with the introduction of 
the CFE treaty resolutions in Europe. The U.S. teams were usually accompanied by 
representatives from the Netherlands, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, France, 
Italy and Denmark. In spite of the fact that U.S. inspections were conducted in a 
multinational environment, makeup of escort groups consisted of Americans only.91  
From observation, the American officers were very solid during the conduct of 
verification procedures. The evening or even late-night hours were no obstacle to them to 
perform their assigned tasks such as briefings, for example.  
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The Chief of Operations, On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) European Operations 
Command, the U.S. Marine Corps Officer, Colonel Lawrence G. Kelly,92 claimed that 
“U.S. inspectors occasionally skipped lunch when conducting inspections and that escorts 
were obliged to assist inspectors in carrying out an inspection, even if that meant missed 
meal.93”  
The United States inspectors were strict as far as the loyalty to the CFE treaty 
decisions was concerned. Even despite the flexibility during performed missions, U.S. 
inspectors accomplished their task in high level.94 Moreover, the establishment of a U.S. 
liaison officer post was an example of protecting American interests, while conducting 
Eastern inspections within a NATO state.95 
The policy of President George H. W. Bush appears as an example of 
involvement in CFE matters. The issue of the CFE treaty became highly important 
especially after the dissolution of Soviet Union. In spite of the multilateral character of 
CFE negotiations, discussing the key points made the consultations two-sided. The 
Eastern European nations, as well as NATO countries, understanding the enormous 
significance of CFE treaty, accepted the agreement between Washington and Moscow. 
The West realized that an agreement reached by the United States would be valuable for 
them.96 
President William J. Clinton represented a similar point of view concerning the 
importance of the CFE treaty in the world after the post-Communist period. 
In his speech concerning the updated version of the 1990 CFE treaty, he stated 
that “In all these ways, the adapted Treaty will enhance peace, security and stability 
throughout Europe. Therefore, it is in America’s national interest to sign it now, and to 
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lock in the commitment of other nations to its terms. At the same time, in order to reap 
these benefits, we must have confidence that there will be real compliance.97”  
Today’s approach of the United States toward the CFE treaty was expressed in the 
statement of Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Stephen Rademaker, who said 
that “…the United States stands firmly by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in 
Europe and looks forward to the entry into force of the adapted CFE Treaty. This has 
been our position since the Agreement on Adaptation was signed at Istanbul in 1999 and 
it is our position today…98”    
The Russian approach toward the CFE treaty was influenced mainly by “military 
traditions” inherited after the dissolution of Soviet Union. The willingness to reestablish 
the great and militarily powerful empire was still noticeable after 1991. 
Between the years 1989 and 1991, the number of Soviet Armed Forces dropped 
from 5.3 million men to 2.72 million soldiers belonging to the Russian federation.99 
President Gorbachev initiated large-scale reductions in manpower and armaments 
following the signing of the CFE treaty.100 After 1990, this event contributed to the rising 
of mutual empathy between NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organization bloc. It took a short 
time before the Russian authorities realized that forces authorized for deployment on the 
southern flank of the country were not able to ensure the appropriate security for the 
state.101           
This situation contributed to unwillingness by high military authorities to 
implement the CFE treaty resolutions. Since that time Russia has never fully agreed with 
the obligations of the CFE agreement. 
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According to Adam Boger, “Russia has consistently complied with its overall 
numerical limits and the requirements of the inspection and information regimes…102” 
Those complaints, which existed even before the signing of the CFE treaty, were at the 
beginning dismissed by Mikhail Gorbachev. However, in 1993, NATO leaders were 
requested by Boris Yeltsin to revise the treaty.103 The deployment of Russian forces in 
the area of “flanks” (described in the next chapter) is an issue that causes the main 
disagreement between Russia and the West. 
The war in Chechnya was a factor that changed the approach of some states like 
Germany, Britain and the United States toward the CFE’s concerns in Russia. After this 
event, this group of countries was against implementation of any amendments to the 
treaty before the review conference planned for 1996.104  
Stationing Russian troops on the territory of Moldova and Georgia was another 
example of disagreement with CFE treaty decisions. Russia, nevertheless, explained that 
“near abroad” deployment of troops is crucial to the country’s security.105 In November 
2000, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that “…Problems of the withdrawal of 
Russian troops from the territory of Georgia and Transdniestria are being resolved in 
accordance with the bilateral agreements reached in Istanbul and with interested support 
from our CFE Treaty partners 106”  
Boger defines Russian ignorance toward the CFE treaty as “a result of the 
inappropriateness of the CFE document as a method of limiting Russia’s actions within 
its own territory and near abroad…107” Finally, Russia’s conduct of activities connected 
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with its national security is considered to unconcern CFE treaty terms. Simultaneously, 
Boger makes the argument that NATO is not interested in pressuring Russia to obey the 
CFE resolutions. He states that “NATO nations seem more interested in keeping Russia a 
party to the CFE treaty than in protecting the sovereignty and security of the states in 
Russian near abroad 108”   
Examining the German approach to the CFE treaty is interesting taking into 
consideration the German offensive during World War II and the reunification of 
Germany. Despite those crucial historical events, Germans were and still are, good 
partners in the accomplishment of CFE verification tasks.  
Shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the communist regime 
in the German Democratic Republic, Germany was recognized as a unified state. 
Simultaneously, during this time many European countries like Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, and Czechoslovakia started revolutions that resulted in the collapse of 
communist governments. Factors like large, combined armed forces in both countries, 
and willingness to take control over continental Europe in the past were key concerns 
during CFE treaty negotiations. However, aspects such as German Chancellor Kohl’s 
promise of joint forces reduction and “Declaration by the Government of the Federal 
Republic on the Personal strength of German Armed Forces,” stated that the German 
military forces would be cut.109 After all, before the CFE treaty entered into force, the 
former GDR equipment was used for studying Treaty-limited equipment (TLE) of the 
Soviet army. Moreover, Germany established the Federal Armed Forces Verification 
Center in Geilenkirchen, which was an institution responsible for inspectors’ training 
(including Russian language) and the organization of inspection teams.110 Additionally, 
this organization took care about monitoring all activities connected with CFE treaty. 
Brigadier General Doctor Heinz Loquai, director of the Center, explained that “The main, 
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reason for the establishment of the center was Germany’s foreseeable workload in the 
area of the CFE Treaty. Germany had more CFE sites than did Soviet Union.111”  
Finally, considering NATO nations, Germany was a country that developed the 
most wide-ranging training program and was for treaty implementation. The presence of 
numerous NATO’s installations on the German territory was a crucial concern in the 
process of conducting training.112       
 
C. CREATING A NEW STRATEGIC SHAPE OF EUROPE  
The CFE treaty signed in November 1990 contributed to significant strategic 
changes on the European continent. This document is seen not only as a “formal” end of 
the Cold War, but also as a factor identified with the reduction of armaments, troops, and 
the formation of new strategic centers. The “flanks zones”, Russian military equipment 
deployed abroad, the Black Sea region and the redeployment of U.S. troops from Western 
Europe created a totally new view of the European map, which sometimes were even 
concerned as the new threats.  
During the final months of negotiating the CFE treaty, more than 50,000 pieces of 
TLE were relocated to the military installations east of the Ural Mountains. This activity 
was still considered legal due to incomplete work of the treaty. However, after signing 
the CFE treaty in November 1990, the number of equipment of other states was disturbed 
by deployed armaments of the Soviet Union. For some observers, Soviet military 
authorities were suspected of circumventing the CFE treaty, because the Soviet Union 
was the only country that moved armaments outside its border.113  
Similarly, through the problems connected with the “flank zones”, which are 
described in the next chapter of this thesis, Russia was not always viewed as a state 
fulfilling CFE treaty commitments. 
The limits within the zones mentioned above were established in order to prevent 
a potential attack on the two fronts, which included Turkey in the south, Norway in the 
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north, and Southern Europe. The constraints concerning those areas were caused by fact 
that the USSR was the only country whose area straddled the flank zones.114 
Furthermore, Turkey and Norway complained that such a high number of equipment 
deployed within the flank zones would place armaments along their borders.115    
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, as well as existence of 15 newly created 
states, caused the partition of the former Soviet Union’s military equipment in order to 
ratify the CFE treaty. Moreover, Article V allowed Russia to keep about 10 percent of its 
total entitlements in active units within the territory of both flanks; and 85 percent in 
storage.116 In addition, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the North Caucasus 
became the southern border of Russia, which was obliged to divide its flank equipment 
with that of the other newly created states such as Moldova, Armenia, Ukraine, Georgia 
and Azerbaijan.117 Nevertheless, the flanks were not always identified with the threats 
from the Russian side.  
For example, it was stated in 1995 that “…Given that West has no intention of 
becoming involved in conflicts in the former Soviet Union, there is no strong argument 
against allowing Russia to enforce security on its southern periphery…118” 
The redeployment of American troops was another matter that contributed to 
significant military changes on the European continent after signing the CFE treaty.  
As a remnant of the Cold War period, in 1990, about 325,000 U.S. personnel were 
stationed throughout Europe. Moreover, there were more than 1,500 sites in the area of 
Europe, where those forces (and armaments) were located. According to the CFE treaty, 
countries that deployed conventional military equipment outside their own territory, but 
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within the ATTU (Atlantic to the Urals), were recognized as “stationing states.” Those 
armaments were subjected to CFE’s resolutions and inspections, and the stationing states 
were authorized to provide escorts during CFE procedures.119  
There were 8,128 CFE TLE pieces of American forces reduced or withdrawn 
from the Western Europe. Simultaneously, this number represented a 63 percent 
reduction of U.S. offensive forces stationed within the territory of Europe.120 However, 
not all reduction processes can be identified with the large-scale withdrawal. This time, 
there was a need to deploy U.S. combat military forces to the Middle East for the 
purposes of the Gulf War, as well as to reduce its personnel due to the end of the Cold 
War period.121 After victory over Iraq in 1991, a large number of American troops, 
previously deployed in Europe, returned to military installations in the United States. The 
massive withdrawal of U.S. forces was illustrated by USAREUR’s Commander-in-Chief, 
General Crosbie E. Saint, who stated that in 1992 his command was “averaging 500 
soldiers a day leaving Europe.122”  
However, in spite of the fact that managing the force’s withdrawal was a time 
consuming process, the United States was able to return 157 European (mainly German) 
installations to their host states.123   
Finally, one of the factors that influenced the post-CFE treaty military order of 
Europe was the issue of the Black Sea Fleet. 
The weakening of the Black Sea Fleet through the continuous fight with the 
Ukraine over the basic rights was one of Russia’s concerns after 1991.124 Those two 
countries’ failure to comply with the CFE treaty didn’t reduce their treaty-limited 
equipment of naval infantry and coastal defense units subordinated to the Black Sea 
Fleet. The fact that the fleet was manned mainly by Russian sailors and officers caused 
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difficulties in partitioning the fleet.  In June 1993, the President of Ukraine, Leonid 
Kravchuk, and Russian President Boris Yeltsin agreed to split the fleet in half until the 
year 1996. The Russian military authorities, as well as the naval officers, opposed the 
loss of territory from the naval bases. After a few years of negotiations (September 1993, 
April 1994, February 1996), Pavel Grachev, Russian Defense Minister, stopped the 
division due to a disagreement over the basing of the Russian fleet. After all, after 
intensive debating, neither Russia nor the Ukraine destroyed any of the armaments of 
costal defense units and naval infantry assigned to Black Sea Fleet, which in consequence 
put them in a position of not being in obedience with the CFE treaty.125  
The CFE treaty was a factor that significantly influenced security and stability in 
Europe after the year 1990. In “cooperation” with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
it plays a key role in preventing potential conflicts on the European continent. However, 
“forcing” countries to reduce their armaments is not sufficient in itself. All examples of 
non-compliance with the CFE treaty could become suspicious for other nation. What is 
more, new strategic centers (and changes) described above should be considered as 
essential as far as the planning of future European security is concerned. In the process of 
reduction and verification of conventional armed forces, the good will of politicians and 
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IV. CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES VERIFICATION IN 
EUROPE: STATUS AND PERSPECTIVES  
A. PROBLEMS EXISTING AFTER SIGNING THE CFE TREATY 
1. Post-CFE General Dilemmas 
The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) was a core 
document, which significantly influenced security and stability on the continent after the 
post-Cold War period. Keeping an officially established number of military equipment by 
both the Eastern block, represented by countries of Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), 
and NATO members, eliminated the possibility of military hostilities.  Simultaneously, 
the CFE agreement is considered as the first one in which the reduction of armaments in 
some way forced both countries’ blocks to pave the way for permanent peace in Europe.    
However, in spite of the long time, which led to signing the CFE treaty, its 
ratification and implementation, one can argue if there are no threats for security and 
stability in Europe. This part of the thesis allows the opportunity to examine the 
following questions: What problems arose after the CFE treaty ratification? What could 
be their possible solutions? To what extent was implementation of the treaty effective as 
far as European security is concerned? Analyzing the attitudes toward the CFE treaty, 
right away after signing documents, as well as the policy of the engaged countries, is 
indispensable in providing a complete answer to those questions. Moreover, it will be 
interesting to gain more knowledge about the issue of CFE verification in contemporary 
Europe; and to foresee its tendencies in the near future. 
The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) was signed on 
November 19, 1990, in Paris. This fact appeared as a successful accomplishment of long 
months of negotiations between the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact Treaty 
Organization. In spite of fact that the signed document was essential itself, Europe this 
time went through very significant changes. The descent of the Warsaw Pact, and the fall 
of the Berlin Wall significantly changed the situation on the European continent.126 
However, immediately after the agreement’s signing, it was realized that the CFE treaty 
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was not perfect in structure, and left some important European security issues unsolved. 
Most of them were connected with the Soviet Union, which was in the process of 
collapsing.  
Right away after signing, the CFE treaty became a major issue discussed in Soviet 
and Western politics. The last few months of agreement negotiations were considered as 
“a race against time”127, during which the size of military armed forces became the main 
issue on the agenda. On one hand, the Soviet military leadership was not so excited about 
the CFE treaty, which significantly reduced its operational capabilities. On the other 
hand, the representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as Gorbachev and 
Shevardnadze, were ready to agree to the negotiated CFE rules. In late 1990, the 
conventional arms control policy was challenged by conservative communist party 
representatives, leaders from a variety of security organizations, and the defense industry. 
Such a situation caused a major dispute in the West about the Soviet Union’s fulfillment 
of its (signed before) obligations.128  
After the declaration of independence, there was a need in the former Soviet 
Union republics to create national armed forces. Especially the issue of equipment 
ownership was discussed between Russian and Ukrainian officials. While Kiev stated that 
military equipment located on Ukrainian soil was its property, the General Staff argued 
that all of the Soviet armaments belonged to the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS). Russia temporarily expressed its opinion that the former Soviet military belonged 
to the CIS, but if the Commonwealth of Independent States started to be a worthless 
successor, then Russia should be the only inheritor of the Soviet Union, which owns all 
property outside the Russian borders. Russia’s inheritance of the entire corps of former 
officers and the Soviet Union’s strategic point of view significantly influenced the 
internal CIS disagreement over security policy in 1992. Russia reacted immediately to the 
“privatization” of the former Soviet forces by the Ukraine. The officers, for example, 
were ordered not to administer the Ukrainian oath. Russian senior commanders and 
officials attacked the Ukrainian leadership for claims of military equipment within 
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Ukrainian borders. There were cases where some serviceman deserted or defected.129 
This was not the only problem after the signing of the CFE treaty. 
There was no denying that close connections between the government of Russia 
and the high command of newly independent state were not gone. Russian military 
leadership was criticized by some non-Russian representatives, that Russia treats other 
states as an annex of its own territory.130  
The significant political differences among the CIS states concerning the method 
of succession from the Soviet Union made the CFE treaty enormously difficult to fulfill. 
Despite the fact that Western politicians were focused mainly on assuring appropriate 
central control of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal, issues of the CFE treaty connected 
with Russia, as well as consequences of Ukrainian independence, were still actively 
considered by officials in Brussels and Vienna. The agreement among the alliance about 
the treaty’s entering into force was achieved slowly at the end of the year 1991. Every 
person involved with CFE matters knew that the treaty could not be renegotiated and that 
it had to enter into force with a minimum number of changes. However, the CFE treaty 
allowed the process of changes in Article XX.131 According to it,  
any State Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of a 
proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary, which shall 
circulate it to all the States Parties. If an amendment is approved by all the 
State Parties, it shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures set 
forth in Article XXII governing the entry into force of this Treaty.”132  
Finally, the Western states expected the CFE treaty to enter into force (after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union) during the Helsinki CSCE summit, planned for July 
1992. In order to bring the CFE treaty into force after the breakup of the Soviet empire, 
German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher proposed the creation of a “High 
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Level Working Group” (HLWG).133 The activity of this organization was very important 
considering the CFE treaty entry into the force. Regularly held HLWG meetings were 
attended by officials on a very high level. Solving all matters connected with the CFE by 
officials from former newly created countries was one of the major problems after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. The HLWG used the political importance of NATO to 
encourage ratification of the CFE treaty among them. Moreover, HLWG meetings 
explained the idea of the agreement to the leaders of the former Soviet republics who 
were not ready to deal with the technical side of the CFE treaty.134 The first meeting of 
HLWG took place on January 10, 1992. The Russian delegate, Vladimir Petrovsky, 
argued that Russia was the only successor state to the Soviet Union, and that it on its own 
should ratify the CFE treaty. According to Petrovsky, the later implementation packages 
for the treaty with other former Soviet republics should be worked out by Moscow on a 
bilateral basis. This proposition was rejected by the delegations from those republics, 
which were supported by other CFE treaty participants. In addition, Russia was informed 
by Western states that they had recognized this country as the single successor only in 
terms of nuclear weapons and the UN Security Council seat. Conventional arms control 
responsibilities had to be distributed among the republics.135 Finally, during this meeting 
it was agreed that: 
• The CFE treaty should not be renegotiated and should be implemented as 
quickly as possible, 
• Treaty obligations (all parties of the treaty) should be apportioned among 
the former Soviet Union republics, which are obliged to work collectively 
and in full conformity, 
• Some changes of the treaty could be made after its entry into force, 
however they should be kept at a minimum level and formalized after 
entry into the force.136  
Nevertheless, the process mentioned above needed time to accommodate, which 
was not so easy considering the brand-new situation in Eastern Europe after the demise of 
the Soviet Union. 
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In general, splitting the former Soviet Union Empire into fifteen new states 
appeared as the main obstacle to CFE treaty implementation. What is more, with the 
exception of Russia, the created republics lacked the bureaucratic power and suitable 
infrastructure needed to implement CFE reforms in a proper way. During the first months 
after regaining independence there were a lot of problems within the armed forces of 
newly created states, which included: low level of discipline, robberies, desertion, 
uncertain jurisdiction, and considerable turnover at the command level, which caused 
tremendous administrative problems in the CFE treaty’s resolution fulfillment. There is 
no denying that the implementation process was much easier for newly independent 
states such as Russia, the Ukraine or Belarus, than for other former Soviet Union 
republics represented by Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. In the case of 
Russia, vastly inherited arms control bureaucracy helped this country to deal with the 
technical difficulties of CFE agreement implementation. In the case of countries like the 
Ukraine or Belarus, even the lack of skilled arms control bureaucracies was not a serious 
obstacle to agreement implementation. They both were clear about the ownership of 
military equipment, and took control of all conventional equipment on their own 
territories.137 There was another concern connected with the deployment of the Soviet 
Union’s troops (equipment) on the area of countries – satellites during the Cold War 
period.    
The Soviet equipment, which was withdrawn from the areas of Germany, Poland 
and the Baltic states, counted toward Russian holdings of Treaty-limited Equipment 
(TLE). Despite the fact that returning armaments added directly to the Russian reduction 
accountability, Russian authorities wanted it. The reason was it was usually more 
modernized and better maintained in comparison with equipment’s units stationed in 
Russia. The fact that not all equipment from Europe went to Russia (Belarus and the 
Ukraine received some of it) reflected the instability of the amount of TLE in Belarus and 
the Ukraine during the first three years after signing the treaty. Taking over the 
equipment in Europe by non-Russian former republics forced CFE force reduction 
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liabilities of the Ukraine, Belarus and Russia to be revised.138 The smaller former Soviet 
Union states were rather not successful in CFE treaty implementation. In the case of 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Georgia, the undeveloped bureaucracy was not able 
to collect data required by the CFE treaty.139  
Another problem directly related to CFE treaty ratification was the issue of 
inspection in the newly created post-Soviet states. Although separated by boundaries, the 
feeling of unity and sometimes-common goals could be recognized. 
The CFE treaty gave the newly established independent states (former Russian 
republics) the right to verify each other’s military forces. NATO itself disliked the idea of 
inter-group inspections because it didn’t allow the alliance to conduct the maximum 
number of verifications (quotas) that was connected with the investigation of any 
suspicious activities within the territories of Eastern states. Moreover, NATO officials 
were afraid that states would request an inspection when their yearly quota had been 
exhausted by others countries (in this case by former Soviet states). Developed by 
NATO, the “Enhanced Cooperation Program” (ECP) partly solved the concerns about 
conducting inspections. According to the ECP, Eastern inspectors were allowed to 
accompany Western inspection teams during 20 percent of NATO’s inspections of 
declared-sites and 25 percent of reduction inspections. There was hope that such activity 
would be an effective tool in discouraging the Eastern states from inspecting each 
other.140  
2. The European Flanks-Bone of Contention 
The issue of “flanks” was one of the most serious problems that arose after the 
signing of the CFE treaty. The Russian Federation and the Ukraine asked to be relieved 
of the CFE Article V limitation of TLE. This equipment was located in the flank areas of 
their states, which included Leningrad and the North Caucasus Military Districts (situated 
in the Russian Federation and Southeastern Ukraine).141 
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Norway and Turkey were very concerned that the withdrawal of Soviet Union 
forces from Central and Eastern Europe might result in a considerable increase of Soviet 
forces near their frontiers. The original restrictions permitted the Soviet Union to keep 
within the northern and southern flank’s sectors no more than 1,850 tanks, 2,775 artillery 
pieces, and 1,800 armored combat vehicles (ACVS) in active units. Moreover, Soviets 
were allowed to additionally hold, in designated storage sites, 1,000 tanks, 900 artillery, 
and 800 ACVs. One year after the signing the CFE treaty, the Soviet Union was 
dissolved, and several newly created Soviet states signed the Tashkent Agreement. 
According to this document, the Soviet Union’s military equipment was divided between 
Russia, Belarus, the Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan and Moldova. 
Both countries – Russia and the Ukraine – were significantly limited as far as the TLE 
was concerned. Russian active units this time were allowed to maintain up to 700 tanks, 
580 ACVs and 1,280 artillery pieces (600 tanks, 800 ACVs, and 400 artillery pieces in 
Designated Permanent Storage Sites). Active units in the Ukraine were permitted to 
accommodate in the flank zone 280 tanks, 350 ACVs and 390 artillery pieces (400 tanks 
and 500 artillery pieces in Designated Permanent Storage Sites). Such a situation forced 
Russia and the Ukraine in 1992 to request other CFE parties for relief from the flank 
limits, which seemed to them too restrictive.142 These limitations of TLE significantly 
reduced the military utility in both countries. Russia, for example, was obliged to divide 
about 10 percent of its total TLE kept in active units between the Leningrad Military 
District and the Caucasus territory.143 
Solving the flank problem took over two years. All of the CFE states were 
involved in this process in order to achieve the best resolution. The United States during 
this time conducted intense disputes with Turkey, Norway, Russia, the Ukraine, 
Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. In addition, American officials debated 
with non-treaty states, such as the neutral Nordic and Baltic states. The NATO countries 
accepted the common point of view in the flanks discussions, which later on was 
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presented to the Ukraine, Russia and the other parties of CFE. The multilateral 
negotiations among NATO Allies within the CFE Joint Consultative Group (JCG) took 
place in Vienna. The bilateral discussions were held in capitals.144        
In this situation, the involvement of some high-level politicians became 
indispensable. The specific character of Europe, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
was an argument which a lot of diplomats were concerned about. 
After Ukrainian ambassador Kostenko’s formal presentation of the flanks 
problem to the JCG on September 14, 1993, Russian President Yeltsin wrote a letter to all 
NATO leaders. In his message, Yeltsin emphasized the radical changes that appeared in 
the political situation of Europe, as well as the complicated economic and social 
problems of the Russia Federation connected with the redeployment of troops from 
Eastern Europe. He also stated that the districts of Leningrad and North Caucasus made 
up over half the territory of European Russia, and that restrictions imposed were unfair in 
comparison with those imposed on any Western state.145 In general, two security 
concerns were taken into consideration by the United States and other CFE signatories as 
the Russia and the Ukraine called for flanks limits relief. First of all, there was a need to 
preserve the integrity of the CFE treaty. There were a few events where the Russian 
representatives threatened to support their withdrawal from the CFE treaty if their 
demands connected with flanks’ issue were not sufficiently met. In this case, the 
dissolution of the agreement would influence significantly the United States, NATO 
Allies, and consequently the European security situation. The Russian government’s 
officials were concerned that if Russia would implement all of CFE’s conditions, its 
security would be in danger. Second of all, the West realized that any adjustment to the 
CFE flank arrangements must not affect the security of any CFE signatory, as well as any 
country located near the Russian flanks. While the military security of the United States 
and the majority of NATO countries were not affected directly by the Russian flank 
                                                 
144 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE): 
Revision of the Flank Agreement: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 105th Cong., 1 st 
sess., 1997, 15-16 
145 Jeffrey D. McCausland, The CFE Treaty: A Cold War Anachronism? (U.S. Army War College, 
1995), 11.  
47
limits, their security was indirectly affected by the territories of Turkey, Norway, Finland, 
the Ukraine, Moldova and the Caucasus and Baltic states.146  
One of the people who tried to solve the flank problem was First Deputy Chief of 
the Russian General Staff, Lieutenant General V. M. Zhurbenko, who proposed the 
postponement of Article V, and suggested that Russia would be willing to consider some 
additional restrictions connected with the prohibition of an increase in military forces in 
the Leningrad Military District, and their “over concentration” in the North Caucasus 
region.147 In January 1994, the Head of the Russian Delegation, V. N. Kulebiakin, stated 
that:  
… if someone is nourishing the hope that, by not doing anything but 
waiting for the end to the period of reductions the problem of the flank 
restrictions will disappear in and of itself, these reckonings are absolutely 
groundless. If the next six months this knot has not been united, then it 
will necessary to cut it. (Emphasis added.)148  
On one hand, this statement presents the strong will for negotiations with the 
West, which would finally lead into the problem solution. On the other hand, however, it 
presented a point of view that emphasizes a need of Russian self-determination in the 
flank matter.  
In general, the Russian leadership expressed seven reasons explaining why the 
CFE treaty should be changed. First, the tremendous changes within the political 
environment in the world made the basis of the treaty no longer valid. In this view, 
Russia is discriminated against in the treaty by placing internal limits with respect to 
deployment of forces on its territory. Second, a new approved Russian military doctrine 
required balanced military defense within the area of the whole country. Third, the North 
Caucasus Military District, which was considered in the past as a rear area, now became a 
border district, which totally changed the logic of the flanks. Fourth, the Muslim 
fundamentalism developed mainly in southern area arose as the main challenge to 
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Russian security. Fifth, from economic and social points of view, the North Caucasus 
Military District was better prepared for stationing military forces returning to Russia due 
to an already existing infrastructure. Sixth, changes to the CFE treaty do not symbolize a 
model as it has been developing during the intervening years. Finally, it was suggested by 
the Russian spokesman that while their government is a strong follower of the CFE 
agreement, reductions and inspections appear as the key elements of the agreement. 
Moreover, it was believed the treaty itself was not well considered by many members of 
the military. Relatively quickly, Russian leaders pointed out that they are not interested in 
increasing the total TLE’s allocation under the CFE agreement, but in removing of the 
flanks restrictions on what equipment could be deployed in the flanks.149  
There were many concerns about the next step that Russia would take in case of 
disagreement between it and the other parties of the CFE treaty. Withdrawal from the 
CFE treaty, refusal of Article V of the document, dealing with international repercussion 
(while maintaining its holdings in the flank zones), transfer of armaments to supported 
and controlled armed groups on the areas of smaller former republics were the most 
probable Russian courses of action.150 
There were few aspects that Russia considered when it agreed to the special 
conditions on the flank zone in 1990. This time, the Soviet general staff still viewed 
Central Europe as a region of possible military operations. This time the southern region 
was not considered as a potential theater of military hostilities in a future war with 
NATO. Because of that, the high limits of the CFE treaty in the central zone harmonized 
with the relatively low limits in the flank zone, which were established according to 
traditional Soviet strategic orientation. Moreover, strategic and political reasons pushed 
Russia to deploy more military equipment in the flank zone than was officially allowed 
by the CFE treaty. The low living standard of military officers in Russia (mainly junior 
officers) was one of the matters discussed on the civil-military level. There was a 
problem with providing housing for officers returning from their previous foreign 
deployments. This problem became bigger when, because of the CFE flank rule, only a 
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limited number of military units could be redeployed in Leningrad or the North Caucasus 
Military District, which were considered well-developed regions.151 According to one 
Russian report,  
The construction of a further nine military towns (with more than 10,000 
apartments) is nearing completion [in southern Russia] and Russian units 
due to be withdrawn from German territory will go there. But unless the 
problem of the flank limitation (is) resolved we will have to create the 
necessary facilities in other locations. That will entail a considerable rise 
in the cost of construction, which is more economical in the south than in 
other regions, such as the north.152 
The Ukraine was a country where the flank limitation reflected the political and 
military situation as well. It was believed that the flank limitation in the Ukraine must be 
reviewed once again. The defense experts stated that their country needed better 
distribution of forces within the country. In case of flank limitation, the Ukraine would be 
forced to deploy the bulk of its forces in the Carpathian Military District. Such a solution 
would be a violation of the NATO aim of reducing the number of forward deployed 
forces. Moreover, in order to provide sufficient time for military planners, the decision 
had to be taken by the middle of 1994. There is no denying that this situation was tightly 
connected with Russo-Ukrainian aspects such as: the dissolution of the Kiev Military 
District shared by the two countries, the presence of Russian military in Moldova, and the 
increasing trend of Russian nationalism in the Crimea. Additionally, the Russian 
Federation and the Ukraine were obliged to reach agreement about the distribution of 
TLE that was assigned to the Black Sea Fleet. The Ukrainians, of course, were very 
concerned about any flanks relief given to Russia because of security reasons. Finally, 
similar to the case of the Russian Federation, implementation of flank restrictions 
demanded high finances for constructing new military facilities in the Carpathian 
Military District and the Northern Odessa region.153   
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The weak economic situation and the impossibility of investing large sums of 
money into the building of military facilities was expressed by military officials, who 
claimed that the decisions taken by CFE parties were unfavorable to the Ukraine. 
In September 1994, General Gennadiy Gurin stated that,  
Under the present conditions of our economy, we do not have the means 
needed to relocate troops in order to fulfill the flank limits, and we want 
only one thing – to retain the existing infrastructure of military units. 
Proposals tied to the possibility of disbanding troops do not stand up to 
criticism, since disbanding troops is more expensive than relocating them, 
due to unavoidable costs of providing housing for officers’ families, 
paying compensations, etc.154  
In the case of the Ukraine, the change of the flank rule would permit it to spread 
Ukrainian military forces more regularly within the territory. For Ukrainians, as for 
Russians, the south was considered as the area of possible military threat.155 
In order to end the flank problem, the West (the United Kingdom and the United 
States) proposed a few potential solutions. They suggested that the Russian troops in the 
North Caucasus could be “light” – equipped with military equipment not limited by the 
CFE treaty. Small caliber artillery, trucks, and infantry weapons seemed to be more 
suitable for the Caucasus terrain. What is more, the West suggested that there is no flank 
limitation for Russians as far as aircraft are concerned, and that equipment for Russian 
units located in the flank zone could be kept outside the territory, but at an appropriate 
distance that allows for rapid deployment.156 In September 1995, NATO presented the 
proposal at the JCG in order to finally resolve the flank problem. The coalition suggested 
to: 
• Keep the CFE flank limits unchanged;  
• Remove some areas from the Russian and Ukrainian flanks to make the 
territory smaller; 
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• Restrict the number of TLE in the territories eliminated from the flank 
zone; and  
• Implement transparency and verification procedures within the old as well 
as new created zones.157  
In November 1995, the JCG approved a plan for a flank agreement, following 
aspects proposed by NATO. A large number of consultations and debates took place in 
Vienna and other capitals in order to finalize the details of the general outline. After all of 
these, the final agreement on the flank issue was finally reached at the CFE Review 
Conference in May 1996. The “Flank Agreement” stated that territories mentioned below 
would no longer be included in the flank zone: 
Odessa oblast in Ukraine; 
Volgograd and Astrakhan oblasts in southern Russia; 
An eastern part of the Rostov oblast in southern Russia; 
Kushchevskaya repair facility in southern Russia and a narrow corridor in 
Krasnodar Kray leading to Kushchevskaya; and    
Pskov oblast in northern Russia.158 
Finally, in spite of the fact that the flank limit appeared as the most important, 
there was still a problem that made the implementation of the CFE treaty more difficult to 
accomplish. 
The issue was the cost of the destruction of Russian military equipment after the 
reduction of forces. It was estimated that the cost of destroying a single tank was over 
800,000 rubles. Even so-called “environmental destruction” of armament was discussed 
in the JCG forum to avoid high costs. These costs were caused mainly by a usage of a 
large number of workers, high costs of energy, and a desire to recover the maximum 
quantity of metal from conducting this process. In addition as a commitment related to 
the treaty, the Soviet Union agreed to destroy about 16,000 TLE pieces moved east of the 
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Urals. Considered by Russia a “political” rather than “legal” obligation of the Tashkent 
Accord, by the middle of 1994, only a small part of this equipment was destroyed.159 
B. VERIFICATION FOCUS IN EUROPE NOWADAYS AND IN THE 
FUTURE  
1. Conventional Arm Forces Verification Today    
In contemporary Europe, the issue of the CFE treaty looks different from the early 
1990s. New developing European economies, programs and enlargement of security 
institutions (NATO, EU) caused a different approach toward verification of armed forces 
today. 
Considering the fact that the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union were dissolved 
rather rapidly, the CFE had quite a short time to prove its importance, but this goal 
became clear at the beginning of the early 1990s. In spite of the main aim, which was 
standing in front of CFE agreement, conducted verification contributed more to 
moderating tensions between the two blocs. Additionally, the treaty was a significant 
document in terms of concerns about the reunification of Germany and the withdrawal of 
Soviet forces from the territory of Eastern Europe. Even U.S. military forces that were 
stationed in Germany were inspected before their deployment to the former Yugoslavia. 
Moreover, the importance of the CFE treaty on the area of European security was 
noticeable in smoothing U.S. – Russian relationships and easing the Russian point of 
view in the light of the NATO enlargement.160 
In spite of the end of Cold War period and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
CFE treaty is significant for all participating states. It is believed that this document plays 
a main role in maintaining peace in the whole of Europe. In addition to the traditional 
role of the CFE agreement, it started to act as a crisis management instrument in Europe. 
The security problem, which confronts Europe today, is no longer devoted to preparing 
for surprising attacks. It seems that nowadays the matter of security lies within the states. 
Arms control obligations inherited after the signing of the CFE treaty are not sufficient 
for players who don’t want stability and for whom conventional military forces are the                                                  
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single instrument of agreement. The problem of the Balkans appears totally different in 
comparison with the problem of the post-Cold War establishment and the bloc-to-bloc 
confrontation. In case of East-West disputes, the CFE treaty was a document that 
prevented the escalation of conventional conflict. The Balkan crisis is characterized by 
the activity of local actors who violate international law and human rights. In this case, 
arms control is no longer a dispute between two confronting sides, but a tool helpful for 
disarmament procedures.161 The CFE, as well as NATO, have little impact as far as the 
current threats to European security and stability are concerned. In spite of the fact that 
the CFE may continue to regulate the limits of armed forces, the war between certain 
nations is rather impossible. Even if some states decide to fight each other, those conflicts 
would engage much smaller military forces than the CFE treaty allows.162  
The arms control challenge nowadays is to assure society that it can live, work, 
and move safe and freely within territories administered by other authorities. The feeling 
of stability at lower force levels and protection from potential foreign attack are as 
important as assurances that people can be secure. Sometimes, nevertheless, the CFE’s 
principles are confused with its attributes. As a result, subsequent treaties are being 
negotiated. The Dayton Accord appears to be a good example of a situation where arms 
control provisions were patterned on the CFE’s equipment, zones, and other matters. CFE 
models were used by officials even though the conflict in Bosnia was caused by totally 
different reasons than the confrontation between the East and West during the Cold War 
period.163 John E. Peters, in his book titled “CFE and Military Stability in Europe,” 
confirms the statement that having in mind a transformed security situation in Europe, the 
CFE treaty is much less devoted to typical Europe’s problems. Its inspection regime and 
some features are not very helpful in solving of current concerns. The CFE inspection 
quotas, as well as the inspection system, are less suitable for today. Nowadays, more 
states are willing to inspect Russia and its neighbors than they were in the past.164  
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Moreover, as experience shows, there is an unwritten agreement between the 
NATO members that they not inspect each other. For example, Poland after joining 
NATO in 1999 is inspected mainly by states - former Soviet Union’s republics, which 
share a border with it (the Ukraine, Belarus).  
The CFE treaty was successful in terms of the reducing of military equipment 
after the Cold War period. More than 50,000 tanks, artillery pieces, and aircraft were 
destroyed or removed from the European continent in order to accomplish CFE 
obligations. The agreement is not the only tool responsible for arms control. There is no 
denying that the CFE, as well as a Vienna-based organization responsible for realization 
of treaty resolution, influence significantly the geopolitical situation in Europe. Russia 
(which recently used its own armed forces in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Chechnya) is still 
considered a superpower in Europe. The treaty still serves as a mechanism that helps to 
build confidence among European nations and to assure Russia that NATO enlargement 
will not pose any threat.165  
Even today, the policy of Russian President Vladimir Putin reflects the 
importance of the CFE treaty in Russia. Simultaneously, it emphasize that in spite of the 
formal end of Cold War era, the concerns about CFE agreement are still alive. Signed in 
1990, the CFE treaty is continuously modernized and updated.  
On July 19, 2004, Vladimir Putin signed a federal law on another updated CFE 
treaty ratification. For the time being, the treaty (innovated) version from 1999 is still in 
force, and will remain so, until all 30 members agree to the lastly modified document. 
Moreover, Russia is very concerned about the replacement of the original treaty because 
of new NATO members (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), which don’t have military 
equipment limits according to the old treaty. Those countries cannot sign the changed 
version until it is in force. According to Moscow, NATO could take advantage of the fact 
mentioned above and accumulate armed forces next to the Russian border.166 Further 
evidence that the CFE problem is still debatable is the statement of Vladislav Chernov, 
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the head of Russian delegation in the JCG. In his opinion, the CFE treaty has a character 
of “a silent sabotage” among the western countries. He stated that the western states are 
“looking for various excuses to detain ratification and entry into force of one of the most 
principal treaties in Europe – the CFE treaty, which, in case of its adoption, could 
contribute to strengthening stability and security in the European continent.167” 
Additionally, Chernov emphasized that the ratification period of the CFE Treaty 
Adjustment Agreement is too long, and that the CFE treaty can better establish security 
and peace relations on the continent.168  
2. The Future of CFE Verification  
It seems to be difficult to predict what will be the future of verification of arms 
control in Europe. The contemporary political and economical situation in the Continent 
is still changing, which creates the new challenges for CFE rigors.  
The CFE treaty is planned to exist with no limit. While there may be little interest 
in enlargement of the document to other categories of military equipment, the Protocol of 
Existing Types of Conventional Armaments and Equipment (POET) must be 
continuously updated to include new models brought into service. Moreover, there is still 
a need for transforming the arms control process from a “quantitative” to a “qualitative” 
one. What is more, from the CFE perspectives, the issues like U.S. – European 
relationships and U.S. policy toward the Russian Federation, are significant.169 For the 
time being, the issue of flank zones in Russia is unresolved. Lasting dissatisfaction with 
the flank agreement might force Russia to take some steps in order to increase its 
influence on the flanks region. It should be realized that some points of the CFE 
agreement might not be satisfactory for regulating stability in Europe. In case of Russian 
insistence on reconsidering the flank problem, greater interest in new stability measures 
can arise. There are a few possible scenarios of structural stability which include the 
creation of special exclusion zones with prohibited or limited TLE, as well as establishing 
sub zones which restrict TLE density in all states. There is a possibility that in order to 
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prevent local conflict (like Chechnya) some parts of countries’ territory could be formally 
excluded from the treaty. It would be a useful tool for a government, which in order to 
defeat its enemies, would concentrate a sufficient number of TLE.170  
There is no denying that nowadays Russia is more interested in maintaining its 
current number of armed forces than in discussing any possible future reductions. 
Simultaneously, it could be a good way for future Russian leaders to save money by 
investing in a smaller but more capable army.171     
According to John E. Peters, the negotiations between allies in the future would 
make little sense. In the era of NATO enlargement, the members of the alliance will not 
be interested in negotiating arms control matters with each other. Another challenge for 
CFE is to bring new members (like Baltic states) to the agreement. This membership 
would help to protect those states from Russia’s pressures. Moreover, by annually 
collected data declarations, those states would ensure other neighbors about the lack of 
threats from their side.172 On July 21, 2004, the Baltic News Service published an article 
in which the Russian Foreign Ministry encouraged Baltic states like Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania to join the CFE treaty. It expressed a need for the elimination of the “grey 
areas” not covered by the arms control obligations in the following statement:  
In this context, we stress the intentions of the Baltic states and Slovenia, as 
recorded within the framework of the Russia-NATO Council, to join the 
adapted treaty after it enters into force. We also expect that those countries 
will comply with its goals and principles before they join the CFE 
treaty.173   
It must be realized that a sufficient level of armament is a subjective point of 
view.  While it is sufficient for one country, another state can consider it as 
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overestimated. Because of this fact, there is a need for establishing joined demands and 
criteria, which allow estimating an appropriate sufficiency level for every country.174 
The CFE treaty seems to be helpful to European officials. This document allows 
them not to worry about states’ military activity and cooperate actively in the area of 
political and economic matters. Moreover, the CFE agreement is supportive to the slow 
process of the Russian democracy, further enlargement of the European Union and 
activity of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.  
According to an article by Jonathan Dean, titled “Future of the CFE Treaty”, 
Europe is a continent with too many weapons. The author suggests the new process of 
reduction that would include thirty members of CFE agreement, as well as Sweden, 
Finland and Austria. All of those countries would be placed in one of the following 
categories: large, medium and small, according to the total number of reducible 
equipment. The author proposes to reduce the following categories of forces during a ten-
year period: 
• Large category – 5% yearly; 
• Medium category – 3% yearly; 
• Small category – 1-2% yearly.175 
The author assumes that the proposition of the next force reduction in Western 
Europe (with budgets being under fiscal stress) would encourage further funds cuts. In 
the case of the United States, further negotiation about force reductions would create a 
stronger will of diminution of U.S. forces in Europe, no matter what the outcome of the 
debate would be. In spite of still-present tensions between the East and West, there is a 
high probability that the Western states, instead of discussing further force reduction, will 
focus on keeping the existing number of forces.176  
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Summing up the arguments mentioned above, there are some conclusions to be 
drawn. There is no denying that the CFE treaty influenced significantly the security and 
stability in Europe. By its specific character, it reduced the numbers of military 
equipment, which finally, to a large degree, eliminated potential conflicts between both 
eastern and western blocs. However, continuous dissatisfaction of some newly created 
independent states (former republics of the Soviet Union), is evidence of a still-hostile 
policy toward the West. Bearing in mind the large amount of military equipment 
inherited by Russia or the Ukraine after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, those 
countries still pose a threat. In spite of long debates concerning the CFE issue, they are 
still willing to maintain quite a large number of armaments “just in case” of potential 
conflict. It is extremely difficult to debate possible solutions to those matters. One of 
them, from the point of view of this thesis, would be encouraging the membership of 
“troublemakers” in the alliance. However, the latest events in the eastern regions have 




There is no denying that the signing of the CFE treaty was one of the most 
significant events which took place in Europe after World War II. This document 
appeared as a helpful tool to prevent possible conflicts on the European continent that 
could arise. Simultaneously, the treaty is a symbol of the end of the Cold War, which 
considerably influenced some countries that later on became treaty signatories. 
Apart from being a conflict-preventive treaty, the CFE agreement caused the 
reduction of more than 38,500 armaments. At the same time, the treaty’s verification 
measures appeared as the most detailed and complex in comparison with other arms 
control agreements.177  
The CFE treaty was a factor that significantly influenced security and stability in 
Europe after the year 1990. In cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, it 
plays a key role in preventing potential conflicts on the European continent. 
In connection with arms control, NATO should be identified as institution acting 
like a fire brigade, where the scale of conflict is limited by CFE resolutions. In spite of 
the fact that NATO has been successful considering its experience in the post-Cold War 
period, CFE shouldn’t be expected to protect Europe from the local conflicts. Although 
NATO is obliged to improve its ability to respond to small conflicts, both the alliance and 
CFE are responsible for strengthening security and stability in Europe.178 
However, “forcing” countries to reduce their armaments is not sufficient in and of 
itself. All examples of non-compliance with the CFE treaty could become suspicious for 
other nations. What is more, new strategic centers created in Europe after 1990 should be 
considered an essential issue as far as the planning of future European security is 
concerned. In the process of reduction and verification of conventional armed forces, the 
good will of politicians and military authorities appears as an indispensable factor. 
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By its specific character, the CFE treaty reduced the numbers of military 
equipment, which finally, to a large degree, eliminated potential conflicts between both 
eastern and western blocs. However, continuous dissatisfaction of some newly created 
independent states (former republics of the Soviet Union), is evidence of a still-hostile 
policy toward the West. Bearing in mind the large amount of military equipment 
inherited by Russia or the Ukraine after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, those 
countries still could be considered as a potential threat. In spite of long debates 
concerning the CFE problem, those countries are still willing to maintain quite a large 
number of armaments “just in case” of possible conflict. It is extremely difficult to debate 
possible solutions to those matters. One of them, from this thesis’ point of view, would be 
encouraging the membership of “troublemakers” in the alliance.  
Finally, even if there are some designs on latent enlargement of military 
equipment within some nations, the resolutions of the CFE treaty are factors that 
discourage conspiracy of potential enemies. Personal experience shows that even though 
the job of the CFE inspector is pleasant and satisfying, simultaneously performed tasks 
are very demanding and responsible. At the same time, it is a source of pride being able 
to guard declarations of the CFE treaty and to secure the beautiful European Continent at 
the same time. 
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